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Tax Policy and Foreign Direct Investment
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the implications of the most common system of
taxing foreign source income. It is argued that, because the repatriation
of earnings to the home country investor and not the earnings themselves
are typically the source of tax liability, the foreign source income tax
should affect foreign investment differently depending on the required
transfers of funds within the firm.
One implication of viewing the tax in this fashion is that in order
to maximize after tax profits, a firm should finance its foreign investment
out of foreign earnings to the greatest extent possible. That is, a firm's
required foreign return jumps at the point at which desired foreign invest-
ment just exhausts foreign earnings. This allows us to draw a distinction
between "mature" foreign operations, which are at any point in time financed
at the margin by reinvested earnings (and perhaps also pay dividends to
their parent firm in the home country), and "immature" foreign affiliates,
which rely on funding from their parents (and should not be paying dividends).
It is noted that survey evidence on multinational firm behavior is consistent
withthis distinction. Direct investment data indicate that mature foreign
operationsprobably account for nearly ninety percent of U.S.foreign direct
investment.
The discussion then turns to investment incentives. It is shown that
the home country's rate of tax on foreign source income and the presence
or absence of a foreign tax credit should be irrelevant to a mature foreign
operation's investment and dividend decisions. This conclusion, which
conflicts sharply with the conventional wisdom, follows because the home
country tax acts as an unavoidable cost. New firms' investment decisions
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The importance of foreign direct investment to the economies ofmost
countries has increased dramatically in recent years.' Forinstance, more
than a quarter of new investment by U.S. firms is made inforeign operations.
Predictably, the tax treatment of income earned by multinational firms has
been the subject of frequent debates in both the firms' homecountries and
the countries which host the investments. Broad issues of bothequity and
efficient international investment patterns are raisedby the interactions of
separate national tax systems.
This paper focuses on issues of home country tax policy. Inparticular,
it is argued that the incentive effects of the mostcommon system of taxation
are very different from those usually ascribed to such a policy. Theanalysis
of investment incentives is contained in later sections of thepaper. First,
the international tax policy issues and the conclusions ofprevious studies
are briefly examined. While most of the existing literature is concerned
with U.S. policy, the results have broader applicability.
One basic concern of all countries has been the double taxation ofcor-
porate income which would arise if both the home country and the hostcountry
ignored the multinational nature of a firm and its earnings.Generally,
such double taxation has been avoided by action of the homecountries, which
have recognized the primary right of host countries to tax incomeearned in
their jurisdictions and have forgone a portion of the taxesthey would normally
have collected on foreign source income, Some countrieshave, in fact,
adopted a "territorial" approach to taxation, under which no tax is owedon
income earned abroad. Under the more common "residence"approach, double
taxation may still be alleviated by allowing a credit for taxespaid to the
host country government. The former system producesan effective tax rate—2—
equal to the host country rate, while thelatter results in an effective tax
rate equal to the greater of the twocountries' rates. Thus, the two systems
result in equal tax burdens only if the tax rate inthe host country equals
or exceeds that in the home country.
Some relief from double taxation is, it is believed, necessaryto preserve
incentives for capital to be efficiently allocated on aworldwide basis. That
is, capital should be employed in the countryin which it will earn the highest
gross return.
The United States employs the residence approachwith a credit given for
foreign taxes paid, but proposals to allow only adeduction for foreign taxes
have gained considerable support. Given the corporatetax rates in effect
in most of the world, very high effective ratesof tax would result from ending
the U.S. foreign tax credit. A rejection of the present systemby the world's
largest direct investing nation could apparentlyhave important welfare
effects worldwide, but the proposal is justified by opponentsof the tax
credit by the gains it would bring the U.S. The current system,it is argued,
encourages too much U.S. capital tobe invested abroad. The reason is that
firms will profitably invest abroad as long as theafter—tax return abroad
exceeds the after—tax return at home, while the U.S. asa whole gains only
if the after—foreign—tax return abroad exceedsthe gross return athome.2
Therefore, it would seem that providing only adeduction for foreign taxes
paid is necessary to make firms behavein a fashion consistent with the
national interest.
One other aspect of residence—based systemswhich has come under attack
in the U.S. is that the home country tax isdeferred. That is, the tax on
foreign source income is paid only upon repatriationof the income to the
parent firm. Deferral reduces theeffective tax rate on income earned abroad—3--.
and provides some further inducement to foreign direct investment. While
deferral has been called a "loophole" by its critics, it is regarded bymany
as crucial to guaranteeing consistency with a basic premise of U.S. law:
that a firm should be taxed only on income it actually receives.3 In fact,
ending deferral raises serious constitutional issues, particularly in the case
of parent firms who, by virtue of having minority ownership in a subsidiary,
may not be able to control the timing of dividend payments.4 Exceptions to
the general policy have been made for actions motivated by tax avoidance, but
the basic principle, that the U.S. should tax not the income of firms incor-
porated abroad but the income recieved from them by U.S. parents, has remained
5
intact.
The interaction of the foreign tax credit and deferral of the home country
tax makes examination of foreign investment incentives quite complicated when
the home country's tax rate exceeds the rate of creditable host country tax.6
Generally, those interested in the incentive effects of the U.S. system have
treated deferral as a reduction in the effective tax rate. Specifically,
deferral is viewed as reducing the total effective rate from the U.S. rate
to a linear combination of both countries' rates, with the dividend payout
ratio determining the fraction of subsidiary earnings subjected to the U.S.
rate.7 An increase in the U.S. taxon foreign source income, due either to
the elimination of the foreign tax credit or to the imposition of a special
tax, would discourage foreign direct investment. This, of course, is the
result anticipated by those who propose repeal of the foreign tax credit.
In this paper a much more important role is ascribed to deferral. It
is argued that, because the repatriation of profits and not the earning of
profits becomes the source of tax liability under deferral, the corporate
tax when applied to foreign source income should be thought of as a tax on—4—
the transfer of funds. Therefore, this tax could have very different
consequences from those of the tax on domestic income and itseffects could
be highly dependent on the funds transfers involved in the marginal foreign
investment. In particular, it will be important to distinguish the tax
implications for new foreign investments from those for what we willcall
"mature" foreign operations, namely those which do not require continuing
injections of funds from the parent.
First, it is shown that the mature foreign operations, which at the
margin are deciding to reinvest versus pay dividends to their parents, are
theoretically distinct from the "immature" foreign operations, which at the
margin are investing funds transferred from theparent.8 That is, we
domonstrate that all foreign direct investment in subsidiaries currently
paying dividends to the parent firm should consist of retained earnings.
Some casual empirical evidence is cited to support the validity of this
separation. In Section II the data on financial behaviorof U.S. multi-
national firms are examined to estimate the fraction of foreign investment
accounted for by earnings retained abroad. The conclusion is that all but
a small fraction of U.S. foreign direct investment appears tobe financed
by retained earnings of mature subsidiaries.
In the third section, we examine the effects on mature subsidiaries'
investment and dividend decisions of a home country tax system of the U.S.
type, and of changes in such a tax law.It is shown that the home country's
rate of tax on foreign source income and the presence or absenceof a foreign
tax credit should be irrelevant to a mature subsidiary's investmentdecisions,
as long as the home country taxes are deferred. This conclusionconflicts
sharply with prevailing opinion. Similarly, the repatriationof profits
from abroad should be unaffected by the tax treatment of foreign source
income, despite the fact that taxes are deferred until repatriation occurs.—5—
This result stands in contrast to the concerns of some that removing the
foreign tax credit but maintaining deferral would result in reduced income
repatriation.9 Finally, the decisions of the immature subsidiary are examined
and related to the existing foreign investment literature.—6—
I. Foreign Direct Investment and the FundsTransfers It Involves
Foreign direct investment can be accomplishedin several ways. Trans-
fers of funds abroad by a parent firm, either asloans to or equity investments
in subsidiaries, are the most explicit formsof direct investment.10 However,
the retention of earnings abroad by foreignsubsidiaries raises the stake of
the parent firm in the operation of the subsidiary just assurely as do
explicit transfers. Retained earnings investmenthas, of course, been well
recognized, and, beginning in 1979, it has beentreated in the U.S. balance of
payments accounts as two separatetransactions: an impitcit payment of divi-
dends to the parent firm and an investment of thefunds abroad.
Preliminary to the discussion of tax effects oninvestment incentives,
this section demonstrates the impact of the tax system onthe choice among
the several forms of making direct investments. Later,it will be shown
that this choice, which in a world without taxeswould be a matter, of no
significance, can have an important bearing onthe tax rate which applies
to the marginal investment. The choice amongthese forms of direct investment
follows in a straightforward fashion from the followingsimple proposition:
if unnecessary funds transfers result in extra taxliabilities or in earlier
tax liabilities, then the transfers should notbe made.
Previous analyses of tax effects on foreign investmentincentives have
either neglected reinvestment of subsidiary earnings orhave assumed a fixed
retention ratio (a fixed dividend payout ratio), sothat marginal direct
investment can be thought of as involving capitaltransferred directly from
the parent. The assumption of stabledividend payouts by subsidiaries,
even while additional capital flows tothe subsidiaries are taking place, has
been justified in much the same way that the behaviorof domestic firms has
been explained: by the need to maintain a"reasonable'1 debt—equity ratio,—7--
the desire to signal success, or simply habit. Here, the question is one of
how a given amount of internal funds reach the subsidiary, so the debt—equity
ratio is unaffected. Since the transactions under discussion are carried
out within one firm, considerations such as signaling profitability would seem
irrelevant. In general, then, there seems little reason to expect the
dividend payout ratio to be fixed unless taxes give no incentive for firms
to act otherwlse)2 Therefore, we will assume that firms have complete
flexibility to respond to tax inducements.
In a no—tax world, there would be no cost to financial transfers across
national boundaries within the firm. Therefore, the firm would be concerned
only about the net transfer of funds between parent and subsidiary.
What is important for our purposes is the effect of a home country tax
system, such as that of the U.S., including deferral and a foreign tax credit.13
A simple formulation of a home country tax on capital income earned abroad
(at rate t), with a credit for host country taxes paid (at rate t* < t), has
the rate (t —t*)applied to the gross—of—foreign—tax return or the rate
(t —t*)
(1 —t*)applied to the net—of—foreign—tax return. t is paid as the capi—
(t_t*) tal income is earned, while
(lt*)is paid only on repatriated dividends. A
dollar of after—foreign—tax earnings repatriated to the home country results,
therefore, in a receipt of dollars by the parent firm. Because of the
limitation of foreign tax credits to the home tax liability, only the foreign
tax is relevant when t exceeds t.
To illustrate the implications of various financial transactions which
could occur within a firm consisting of a domestic parent and one foreign
subsidiary, suppose that each has a dollar and intends to invest a dollar.
It is clear that simu1taneou repatriation of profits and direct investment
through funds transfer is inferior to the alternative of making no funds
transfers. With no transfers, parent and subsidiary investments leave them—8—
with 1 + r and 1 + r*(l._t*) respectively at the end of the period(or
1 + r +(l)
[1 + r*(l_t*)1 in the hands of the parent if earnings are
repatriated). The alternative of dividend repatriation coupledwith equity
investment simply results in an unnecessary tax payment tothe home contry
government at the time of the initial repatriation.This payment leaves
the parent with only dollars to invest, rather than one dollar. At
the end of a period, parent and subsidiary have --)[1+ r] and 1 + r*(1_t*)
respectively (or the parent has :)[2 + r + r*(l_t*)]if all income is
repatriated). So, regardless of whether the firm intends toreinvest abroad
at the end of the period or repatriate all assetsfrom abroad, making equity
transfers abroad while earnings are being repatriated is a sub—optimal
strategy.
This example, which is summarized in Table 1, allows two sourcesof loss
arising from the sub—optimal transfer policy to bedistinguished. The first
occurs because of an implicit assumption that theeventual repatriation of
the extra paid—in equity constitutes a taxable event.That is, the home
country tax is paid twice on the initialdollar of subsidiary earnings.
However, there is a further loss to the firm makingdividend and equity
transfers which would occur even if the eventual repatriationof the extra
paid—in capital were viewed as a tax—free returnof capital.14 This loss
can be identified as the cost of having to pay the extrahome country tax
immediately, rather than at the end of a period of investmentand would
(t_t*)
equal(lt*)
r. Therefore, we have shown that a subsidiaryshould not be
repatriating profits and receiving equity transfersfrom the parent simul-
taneously, even if the equity can be returned to the parenttax free.
A financial policy of simultaneous dividend payment bythe subsidiary
and direct investment in the form of loans has a similar effect.The dollar
of repatriated earnings produces of parent firm assets, which grow toSubsidiary pays dividend to parent, parent transfersequity to subsidiary
(Repatriation of the equity transfer is taxfree)
IInitialAfter End of Post Repatriation
transfers period
l+r* (l_t*)
Subsidiary pays dividend to parent;parent makes loan to subsidiary (at rate r*)
Injtjall After End of Post—Repatriation transfers period
_____________ (1') (l+:)+r*(lt) (l±r)+1+r*(l-t)
—9—
Table 1
A COMPARISON OF INTERNAL FINANCIALTRANSFER POLICIES
No Transfers Made






+ r) by the end of a period. Since interest payments are ordinarily
deductible under host country tax systems, the subsidiary can pay its gross
capital return to the parent asinterest.15 The principal of the loan is
repaid without further tax liability. As in the case of an equity transfer
which can be reversed tax free, the firm incurs an earlier tax liability by
making these offsetting financial transactions; the cost, in end—of period
(t_t*) dollars,is r
(l_t*) n
In summary, then, a foreign subsidiary should utilize its profits to
finance further investments whenever possible, rather than paying dividends
to the parent and receiving direct investment from the parent in any form.
Only those foreign subsidiaries without sufficient earnings should rely on
parental financing. This result, that a tax on transfers of funds from
subsidiaries to parents should make firms avoid unnecessary transfers, is
certainly not surprising. However, it calls into serious question the
previous discussions of the foreign investment decision which presume that
parent firms are making equity transfers to dividend—paying foreignsub-
sidiaries.
These previous studies have relied on the aggregate foreign investment
data which show substantial dividend payments and parent company transfers
of funds taking place at the same time. Our analysis is in no way incon-
sistent with this observation, so long as the same firms are not involved
inboth transactions. In fact, there is a great deal of casual empirical
evidence from U.S. firms consistent with the predictions of our analysis.
Barlow and Wender (1955) reported, for example, that U.S. firms operating
abroad tend to "expand the business within the country through reinvestment
of local earnings to the greatest extent possible." From their survey of
U.S. subsidiary firm behavior, Robbins and Stobaugh (1973) similarly conclude—11--
"After the initial incubation period, retainedearnings and depreciation
allowances are the dominant source of funds, and thesesources, when coupled
with local brorowing, leave little need for fresh funds fromheadquarters."
Unfortunately, there is a near absence of empirical evidence on this issue
from sources other than interviews orsurveys of firms.16
More recently, Gilman (1980) has presented empirical evidenceon sources
of funds employed by multinational firms, concluding thatnet parents' contri-
butions are generally minor, "only becoming a significantsource of foreign
asset financing when asset growth is very rapid, past investments smallor
profits small or negative." Unfortunately, his data, while disaggregatedby
OECD country, are aggregated across firms; andso, his investment figures net
any dividend payments from capital transferred abroad. However, the cases
in which funds transfers are found to be significantare those in which we
would expect our arguments above to not be applicable, so theresults are
at least not contradictory to the conclusions reached here.17
Without data at the firm level, which could allow isolation of firms
which produce sufficient foreign earnings to finance their chosenlevels of
foreign direct investment, it is necessary to be somewhat cautious.However,
both our theoretical analysis and the evidence available t this timeindicate
that direct investment studies should differentiate the behavior oftwo types
of firms. We will, therefore, characterize foreignoperations as "new" (or
"immature"), in which case the marginal source of internal funds isa transfer
from the parent, or as "mature", in which case themarginal source of funds is
a reduction in dividend payments to the parent. As we will show in Section
III, the responses of the two types of firm to a tax policy change could be
very different. First, we will examine evidence on the proportion of U.S.
foreign direct investment accounted for by each category of firm.—12—
II. The Evidence
In order to discern whether "maturet' or "immature" firms are more
representative of U.S. foreign direct investment, individual firm data would
be required. Since such information is unavailable, inferences about marginal
sources of direct investment must be made from aggregate data.
Very reliable evidence exists on the average source of internalfunds.
Figure 1 shows the historical pattern of U.S. foreign direct investmentand
its division into transfers from parent firms and reinvested earnings. The
data indicate that a dramatic change has occurred over the past fifteen years
in the method by which direct investment is carried out. Reinvested earnings,
which formerly played a minor role in direct investment now account for over
three quarters of the total; the change is even more impressive for manufac-
turing investment alone.
The trend toward greater reliance on retained earnings in the aggregate
is consistent with the "maturing" of U.S. foreign operations over the past
decade which has often been noted by observers. It has produced a situation
in which the level of firms' operations abroad could continue to grow quite
rapidly without the need for further parent company financing.
That transfers to subsidiaries play a minor role becomes even clearer
when it is recognized that the data on transfers are for both separately
incorporated and unincorporated foreign affiliates, while the reinvested
earnings figures are for only incorporated affiliates. When afirm's foreign
affiliate is not separately incorporated, all investment is treated as an
"equity and intercompany account" capital outflows in the Commerce Department
statistics. Similarly, the earnings of such affiliates are immediately
included in the company's consolidated income and are taxed as soon as earned.
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Source: U.S. Commerce Department,
Survey of Current Business, August, 1980.—14—
percent of U.S. foreign direct investment which occurs in incorporated
affiliates. As Table 2 shows, nearly ninety percent of such investment is
made out of the profits of the subsidiaries.
While this evidence seems striking, it does not offer conclusive proof
that retained earnings provide the marginal source of funds for most invest-
ment. Evidence on the marginal source of funds is more indirect. As the
theory of Section I has indicated, the payment of dividends should signal
a reliance on internally—generated funds as the marginal source of finance.
The dividends received from foreign subsidiaries have increased from less
than three billion dollars in 1970 to more than nine billion dollars in 1979.
In recent years, about forty percent of total foreign subsidiary earnings
have been paid out asdividends)8 In combination, the available evidence
points to a very large percentage of U.S. foreign direct investment being
undertaken by mature firms.—15—
Table 2
Characteristics of U.S. Direct Investment —1979
Total Direct Investment
Reinvested Earnings of Incorporated Affiliates
Equity and Intercompany Account Outflows
Unincorporated Affiliates
Incorporated Affiliates
Reinvested earnings as percent of total
















Source: U.S. Commerce Department, Survey of CurrentBusiness, August 1980—16—
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III. The impacts of Taxes on Mature Foreign Operations
Since at least U.S. foreign direct investment seems to now be dominated
by firms employing foreign earnings as their marginal source of finance of
new foreign investment, we now turn to an analysis of their behavior. While
in a no—tax world, the fact that such mature firms are the typical investors
would be irrelevant for analysis, the optimal investment decisions in a
system with taxes can be quite sensitive to the marginal sourceof investment
funds. In particular, common home country tax systems, which we have argued
can best be viewed as imposing a tax on the transfer of funds from the sub-
sidiary to the parent, will obviously affect foreign investment decisions
differently depending on whether the funds are already abroad.
Consideration of asLmple marginal investment decision of a mature
foreign subsidiary serves to illustrate this point.. Suppose that a foreign
subsidiary has a dollar of after—foreign—tax earnings which it can either
reinvest or repatriate to its parent. If the dollar is reinvested, the
dollar plus the one—period investment earnings will be repatriated at the
end of the period.20
If the subsidiary firm repatriates immediately, the parent receives
one dollar, must pay the home country tax net of foreign tax credit,and
therefore, has at its disposal dollars.21 After investing this amount
for the period, the parent has
By comparison, the subsidiary could reinvest a whole dollar in its
own operations, ending the period with [1 +r*(l_t*)]to be repatriated as a
dividend to the parent. Upon receipt of the dividend, the parent must pay
the home country tax on the original dollar of earnings and the return earned
during the period, but it can claim a credit for the foreign taxes paid. So,—17—
(l—t) the parent receives [1+r*(l_t*)].
Comparing these two decisions, it can be seen that thesubsidiary will
optimally reinvest rather than repatriating profits if r*(l_t*)exceeds r.
That is, the home country system of deferringtaxes and providing a credit
for host country tax payments induces multinationalfirms to invest abroad
up to the point at which the after—foreign—tax return available abroad
equals
the available domestic after—tax return.Surprisingly, the domestic tax
applied to foreign source income plays no role in the firm'smarginal invest-
ment decision; the firm behaves in the samemanner as it .qould with no home
country tax on foreign source income. So, home country taxsystems
of the U.S. type provide what istermed "capital import neutrality":
the tax rates influencing decisions of both hostcountry firms and foreign
investors in the host country are equivalent.
This conclusion stands in direct conflict with theprevious research
which notes that taxing at the domestic rate witha foreign tax credit provides
for "capital export neutrality" (the same taxrate applied to the foreign
and domestic investment returns of multinationalfirms) and concludes that
deferral serves to shift the system partiallyaway from such a standard.
Horst (1977), who assumes that new funds advanced fromthe parent are the
marginal source of direct investment, concludes, forexample, that the firm
should optimally equate r to [1 —Pt—(l_p)t*]r*,where !t1nisthe dividend
22
payout ratio.
Our result that the home country tax shouldnot affect the mature sub-
sidiary's investment decision extends to asystem which replaces the foreign
tax credit by a deduction. Under such asystem, a dollar of after—f oreign—
tax earnings repatriated to the parentgives the parent (l—t), which produces
(l—t)(l+r) after one period. A reinvesteddollar, on the other hand, produces—18—
[1 + r*(l_t*)] for the subsidiary and, upon repatriation,the parent receives
(l—t)[l + r*(l_t*)]. Again, the firm is induced to invest abroad up tothe
point where r(l—t) =rn
As noted above, if the home country imposed no tax on foreign source
income, the same condition for optimal investment would hold. Conseauently,
the same optimal foreign investment rule applies under the typical home
country system of foreign tax credits whent exceeds t, generating foreign
tax payments in excess of the amount creditable but leaving no home tax
liability. That is, despite the discontinuity in the foreign taxcredit around
the home country tax rate, one marginal condition is sufficient to describe
the optimal behavior of a foreign investor. Similarly, the investor's opti-
mal decisions are determined in the same manner if it is able to avoid a
tax imposed by the home country.23
These results, which are so contrary to the conventional wisdom, are, in
addition to being very simple, highly intuitive. Since the potential foreign
direct investment is to be financed out of foreign subsidiary earnings, which
will currently or in the future bear the same home country tax liability, the
only question for the firm is in which locations those earningscould be
invested to produce the highest net return. The firm's choice is between a
return of r*(l_t*), reduced by the home country tax, on a dollar invested
abroad, versus a return of r on an after—home—country—tax dollarinvested
at home. The home country tax on foreign source income affects bothavailable
returns equally.
That a revenue—producing tax imposed on foreign source Thcome would not
affect investment decisions may still seem curious. The answer to this puzzle
lies in the unavoidable nature of the tax for a firm with subsidiary earnings.
A tax increase would immediately lower the value to the parent firm of the—19—
future subsidiary earnings, but would do nothing to alter future decisions.
Only for firms with immature foreign operations is the home country tax a
deterrent to investment.
Implicit in these conclusions is the further result that optimal dividend
payments——subsidiary earnings net of reinvestment——are not sensitive to the
home country tax policy toward foreign ource income. Kopits (1972), who
concluded that a rise in the U.S. tax rate would reduce dividend payments,
neglected the future U.S. tax liability due to repatriation. The consistent
treatment of current and deferred tax liabilities is what produces the absence
of an impact on dividends. One casualty of our results, therefore, is the
argument that eliminating the foreign tax credit without ending deferral could
backfire, resulting in greatly reduced dividends and, therefore, possibly
decreased tax revenue.
These conclusions have been based on a simple example, but one which is
quite general. Since no particular assumption has been made concerning the
length of the time period, the results hold even if home country taxes are
deferred for a very long time. The analysis would be invalid, however, if the
home country tax could somehow be avoided eventually. An ability to avoid
paying the home country tax later, but not if repatriation occurs currently,
would tend to cause the firm to invest more abroad. In particular, the
ability to repatriate tax—free at the end of a period would cause a firm to
(l—t) (t_t*) reinvest abroad as long as r*(l_t*) exceedsrfl(l*) —(l_t*)
.Thissitua-
tion could arise if the firm anticipated a tax—favored liquidation of foreign
operations at some future time24 or if a future elimination (or reduction) of
the home country tax were expected. On the other hand, a firm expecting the
home country tax treatment of foreign source income to take an unfavorable
turn will tend to reinvest less abroad.—20—
The existence of operations in many countries changes nothing of sub-
stance in our analysis but does point to a role for funds transfers between
mature and immature subsidiaries. An immature subsidiary of a parent firm
with mature subsidiaries should be financed to the greatest extent possible
by funds transferred from the mature subsidiaries (rather than the parent).
An immature subsidiary optimally follows the investment rule anplicable to
a mature subsidiary if its marginal source of funds is a mature subsidiary's
earnings. That is, our concept of maturity is most appropriately defined by
reference to the firm's aggregated operations abroad.
Thus, we reach the general conclusion that investment by mature foreign
affiliates should be insensitive to home country rates of tax on foreign
source income. It is to the investment decisions of foreign affiliates which
rely on parent funds that we now turn.—21—
IV.TheImpact of Taxes on Immature Foreign Operations
While the available evidence points to thepredominance of mature sub-
sidiaries, in at least U.S. foreign direct investment, thetax effects on
newer foreign operations could be important also,particularly over time.
Unlike the mature firms considered in SectionIII, immature subsidiaries
should in general alter their investment decisions inresponse to tax changes,
since the tax is not, for them, an unavoidable fixedcost as it is for a
mature firm. As we shall see, the precise nature of thetax effects on the
behavior of immature subsidiaries dependson the firms' plans for future
investment abroad.
The situation in which investment is financedby capital transfers from
the parent to the subsidiary is the one consideredin previous foreign
investment studies. As shown in Section I, a firm wouldnot be expected to
be paying dividends at the same time transfersare being received from the
parent. So, the accepted method of analysis which assumes that theincome
generated by new foreign investment faces a weightedaverage of the home
and host country's tax rates, with weights basedon the subsidiary's dividend
payout ratio, seems problematic. 25
The basic notion of a weightedaverage tax rate is, of course, correct
in the sense that in every future period themarginal dividend payout ratio
will determine the marginal rate of combined tax.Furthermore, it is simple
to show that, if a foreign subsidiary were expectedto pay out p of its
earnings in every future period, the weightedaverage rule would exactly
describe the effective tax rate over the life of theforeign operation. That
is, the present value of all future dividendpayments generated by a dollar
of investment abroad (discounted atrn), would equal one only with
r ={l_pt_(l_p)t*}r*.—22—
As our earlier analysis indicates, however, a foreignsubsidiary
currently relying on parent funds will begin to repatriatedividends to the
parent only when, due to earningsreinvestment over time or to reduced
investment opportunities, the return available atthe margin declines.
A precise calculation of the effective tax burden onearnings from a pros-
pective investment would require knowledgeof the marginal dividend payout
ratios in each future period. The weighted averageformula based on some
average dividend payout ratio acrossfirms will, consequently, provide a
better or worse approximation to the tax facing afirm, depending on that
ratio's adequacy in representing the firm's future plans.
In any case, the general thrust of the received theoryis applicable
to the immature firm. A subsidiary whose marginalsource of finance is
capital transferred from the parent faces a taxrate between the host
country tax rate and the home rateof taxing foreign source income, with the
exact value depending on the timing of thedeferred tax payments.—23—
V. Implications
In summary, our analysis of a firm relying on its foreign earnings as
the marginal source of funds for foreign direct investment has left virtually
none of the theory of optimal foreign investment decisions unscathed. For
what is apparently the overwhelming majority of U.S. firms investing abroad,
for example, the size of the U.S. tax burden on foreign source income should
be irrelevant for investment decisions. Even replacing the foreign tax
credit with a deduction would not provide a disincentive for such firms to
reinvest abroad. Similarly, the foreign subsidiary's dec'isions to repatriate
earnings to the parent should be independent of the home country's tax
treatment of foreign source income.
By contrast, a parent firm whose foreign subsidiaries can not finance
their investments without funds transfers from the parent should respond to
an increase in the home country's tax on foreign source income by investing
less abroad. Crucial to the coexistence of both types Of firm is, ofcourse,
some aspect of foreign investment opportunities which is firm specific.
Otherwise, since the required return abroad is lower for mature firms, no
new investment requiring transfers abroad would occur as long as some firms
were reinvesting less than their total earnings.
With foreign investment opportunities being firm specific, home country
taxes on foreign source income are distortionary to the extent that oppor-
tunities arise for new firms to invest abroad. An increase in the tax would
tend to cause reduced foreign investment in the period before a foreign
subsidiary matures and might cause a firm to completely forego the opportunity
to invest abroad. However, in terms of aggregate investment, the impacts of
any tax change are likely to be minor and largely temporary in nature. Thus,
the distinction drawn between the territorial and residence approaches to—24—
taxation is much less important in practice than is commonlybelieved.
Another striking conclusion of our analysis concerns the effectsof
changes in the general system of capital incometaxation in the home country.
Even though the same tax rate might apply to domesticand foreign source
income, changes in that tax rate will, as we have shown,have their main
effect on domestic investment incentives. Therefore, even a tax increase,
which might appear to apply equally to domestic and foreign income,could
cause foreign investment to become more attractiverelative to domestic
investment.
Our results depend on the continued deferral of home country taxes.
The elimination of deferral would, of course, end the distinctionbetween
new and mature foreign operations; and theeffective tax rate on foreign
source income would be the greater of the homeand host tax rates. Propos-
als to end the U.S. foreign tax credit often include theelimination of
deferral. One reason sometimes given for this package is that, otherwise,
the foreign tax credit elimination would increase the incentiveto retain
earnings abroad. As we have shown in this paper,such fears are misguided.
However, the practical significance of our resultsdoes hinge on the like—
lihood of deferral being retained as other features of the tax arechanged.
The constitutional issues raised by current taxation of foreignearnings would
seem to make the chances for moving to such a systemfairly low. In any event,
a full understanding of the effects of the currenthome country systems should
be important in assessing any proposals for change.—25—
FOOTNOTE S
1Direct investment isdistinguished by the existence of capital supplier
control over the "affiliate" receiving the capital.
2Thisargument was made by Musgrave (1969) and numerous others. Later
extensions, such as Hartman (1980) in which other aspects of firm behavior
such as host country borrowing are considered, show theresult to be sensi-
tive to the characterization of the multinational firm.The earlier notion
of foreign investment will be retained here forreasons of simplicity. The
extension of this analysis to take account of thismore recent work is
straightforward.
3See, for example, United Nations(1970).
4lhese issuesare discussed in Fatemi, etal (1976), while a different
opinion of the constitutional question may be found in Krause and Dam
(1964).
5The current law does makeprovision for taxing not only incomes of firms
abroad which are not separately incorporated but also incomesof majority—
owned controlled foreign corporations which do not makesubstantial dividend
payments, which do not face foreign tax rates approximately as highas the
U.S. rate, and which earn significant profits from salesto related parties
or sales outside the country of incorporation. In otherwords, the law is
intended to discourage the artificial shifting of profitsto sales subsidi-
aries in low—tax countries. However, if even acompany which meets these
criteria can demonstrate that its motivation is not taxavoidance, taxes
are deferred. The amount of this currently—taxed retained income
(Subpart
F income), $95.7 million in 1972 (Treasury (1979), is minorby any standard.—26—
6Only brief mention will be made of cases in which the host tax rate exceeds
the home tax rate, since no tax is collected by the home country insuch
instances.
7See Horst (1977).
81n order to focus on these important transactions, we will ignore foreign
subsidiary borrowing from unrelated parties. For discussionsof subsidiary
borrowing, see Horst (1977) or Goldsbrough (1979).
9Kopits (1972), for example, argues that a rise in the U.S. rate of tax on
foreign source income would produce lower dividend payments.
10Foreign affiliates not separately incorporated as subsidiaries are taxed
on a current basis, as noted above. The analysis oftheir behavior is
straightforward and will not be discussed here.
11Curiously in contrast to these studiesareKopitS' (1972) study of subsid-
iary dividends which take these payments as aresidual in the reinvestment
decision and the survey literature on business decisions, to bediscussed
later.
law may force some subsidiaries to pay some dividends in order to
avoid current taxation of earnings retained abroad, but as was noted before,
the practical effect of that provision is doubtful.
13For simplicity, we will ignore foreign withholding taxes, which are paid
to the host country at the time of dividend repatriation,and also the compli-
cations inherent in the corporate income tax itself such as depreciation
allowances.—27—
14Since we are consideringa marginal investment decision, it may be diffi-
cult for such a firm to meet the restrictive conditions under which a return
of capital is allowed (see U.N. (1970)).
15The ability to charge a different rate of interest couldprovide the firm
with an advantage over charging r* in some situations. Making a low—interest
loan to a subsidiary could be a superior way of transferring funds abroad,
in cases in which a tax—free return of equity transferred abroad is not
available. A loan at high interest could be attractive i'f t'exceededt.
16Kopits(1972), who assumes the absence of additional parents' funding,
verifies that the dividend payout ratios of subsidiaries respond to invest-
ment incentives.
'7Gilman does not consider the taximplications of funds transfers in his
analysis, attributing the firms' behavior to "exchange rate illusion".
18US Commerce Department,Survey of Current Business, August, 1980.
'9The effects of a taxon dividend payments made by a purely domestic firm
are explored by Bradford (1981). The method of analysis followed here owes
a great deal to both that paper and the work of King (1977).
20The consideration ofsome discrete time period is, of course, crucial if
deferral of the home country tax is to be incorporated.
this stage, we are still assuming t> t.
221fthe average and marginal payout ratios are equal and the future home
country tax liability on the retained earnings can be ignored, the firm pays
the home country tax on p of its earnings and only the host tax on the remainder.—28—
23The flexibility of transactions within the multinational firm is commonly
believed to proiiide some potential for tax avoidance. The fact that a
sizable volume of taxable dividend payments are made seems to imply that, in
general, the marginal method of transferring funds to the parentfirm
produces a tax liability. See Horst (1977) for a thorough analysisof intra—
firm financial transactions.
24The U.S. law is designed to prevent tax avoidance at the termination of
the foreign operation. The Revenue Act of 1962 specified' that the sale or
liquidation of a foreign subsidiary produces ordinary income for tax purposes
to the extent of earnings previously reinvested. See Musgrave (1969).
similar concerns arise from the standard discussions of the "excess
credits" case, i.e., the case of t> t.—29—
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